

Annotated Bibliographies of Past PSC/INR Senior Theses

Note. The projects summarized below are a sample of the many research projects HPU Political Science and International Relations majors have developed in recent senior theses. To condense the abstracts and ensure that each summary provides basic information about the dataset used, all entries are AI-generated from thesis papers uploaded into the enterprise version of Microsoft Copilot. This version of CoPilot operates as a closed AI system, contractually ensuring that the uploaded files and their contents will never leave the university's protected network. As a result of using AI, some details below may not fully or accurately reflect the original project's focus, research design, findings, or conclusions. The purpose here is simply to give you a sense of the kinds of questions past students have proposed and how those questions were operationalized as projects involving original, multivariate statistical analyses of public-opinion data. In a few cases, project titles have been rephrased to make them clearer for a general audience.

Abrams, Bill. 2025. *Why Do Americans Fear Their Neighbors? Partisan Polarization and Authoritarianism*. This project asks why many Americans believe that the country's greatest dangers come from people living within the United States rather than from foreign adversaries. This question matters because viewing fellow citizens as existential threats can intensify affective polarization, justify violence toward political opponents, and weaken the mutual tolerance required for democratic competition. The study uses the PRRI AVA Wave 2 Authoritarian Survey, designed by the Public Religion Research Institute and fielded in June 2024. The survey included 5,352 adults, with 4,878 observations in the principal regression model. Strong partisans and respondents scoring high in right-wing authoritarian aggression are especially likely to view their fellow citizens as an internal threat, but nearly three-quarters of respondents endorse that perception overall.

Alexander, Rianah. 2018. *Who Supports Democratic Women Running for Congress?* This project asks which voters are most likely to support Democratic women running for the U.S. House and whether female candidates receive a distinctive advantage from women voters. The question addresses an important problem in research on political representation: whether women win because of gender-based solidarity or because the same partisan and demographic forces that shape other elections also determine their support. The study uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a large national survey of American adults, and identifies congressional districts with female Democratic candidates using information from the Center for American Women and Politics. Women, Democrats, and several demographic groups are more likely to support Democratic female candidates, but party identification is by far the strongest predictor of who Americans vote for. The results indicate that partisan alignment typically matters much more than shared gender identity in explaining support for women running as Democrats.

Arasteh, Bijan. 2021. *What Factors Drive Support for the National Front Party in France?* This project asks why some French citizens view the far-right National Front, now called the National Rally, favorably. It tests whether support arises principally from dissatisfaction with democracy and economic insecurity or from opposition to immigration, European integration, and cultural change. The study combines evidence from two Pew Research Center datasets: the Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, which includes satisfaction with democracy and assessments of the National Front, and the 2017 Media and Politics in Western Europe Survey, whose French sample of 2,011 respondents includes attitudes about the economy, immigration, the European Union, education, gender roles, and homosexuality. Dissatisfaction with democracy is not independently significant, and economic evaluations have no predictive power in the fuller model. Attitudes toward immigration and the European Union are the strongest predictors, while lower education also matters. Traditional gender attitudes and homophobia do not independently predict support for the National Front.

Carlmark, Anja. 2025. *Public Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court in a Highly Polarized Political Arena*.

This project asks which personal and political characteristics, beyond party identification and ideology alone, explain unfavorable views of the U.S. Supreme Court, perceptions that the Court is too conservative, and beliefs that it exercises too much power. The question is significant because declining confidence in a branch of government whose legitimacy depends heavily on public acceptance may threaten compliance with its decisions. The analysis uses Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel Wave 149, a nationally representative panel survey of 9,424 U.S. adults conducted from July 1 through July 7, 2024. Women, African Americans, and respondents under 30 are more likely to view the Court unfavorably, while Republicans are much less likely to do so. Contrary to some expectations, college-educated and higher-income respondents are also more critical of the Court and more likely to describe it as too conservative. Because the ideological placement and institutional-power questions were administered through separate survey forms, the sample available for each outcome is smaller than the full panel.

Carothers, Chance. 2024. *Immigrant Attitudes Toward Immigration in Friendly and Hostile Political Climates*. This project asks how immigrants' views about immigration are shaped by the political climates of the countries in which they live. Sweden provides a comparatively immigration-friendly setting, while Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary represent Central European settings with more restrictive immigration politics. This comparison is valuable because immigrants could become less supportive of additional immigration when exposed to a hostile national climate; alternatively, their personal experiences could make them consistently more supportive. The study uses the 2014 European Social Survey, a cross-national survey of European residents. Immigrants are generally more favorable toward immigration than nonimmigrants in both types of setting. Unexpectedly, immigrants living in the more hostile countries are slightly more supportive of immigration than Swedish immigrants, and attitudes across the two settings are more similar than anticipated. The findings suggest that national political context does not straightforwardly determine immigrants' attitudes toward further immigration.

Conrad, Shannon. 2021. *Dual Citizens and Pro-Immigration Policies*. This project asks whether dual citizens' immigration-policy attitudes more closely resemble those of U.S.-born citizens, naturalized citizens, or foreign-born noncitizens. The comparison is important because dual citizens combine formal membership in the United States with legal ties to another country, making them a useful test of whether citizenship status or personal immigration experience has the stronger influence on policy preferences. The study uses the 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a nationally representative survey of more than 60,000 adults administered by YouGov. The focal groups include 54,878 U.S.-born citizens, 1,517 U.S.-born dual citizens, 2,051 foreign-born U.S. citizens, 1,343 foreign-born dual citizens, and 1,010 foreign-born noncitizens. U.S.-born dual citizens are not consistently more supportive than other U.S.-born citizens. Foreign-born dual citizens are more supportive than foreign-born U.S.-only citizens, but not consistently more supportive than noncitizens, indicating that foreign birth matters more than dual citizenship alone.

Cook, James. 2024. *Do Veterans Differ from Their Co-partisans on Firearm Policy?* This project asks whether U.S. military veterans hold the same firearm-policy preferences as nonveterans within their political parties. The question is useful because veterans have distinctive training and experience with firearms, yet their policy attitudes are often presumed to reflect Republican or Democratic positions without accounting for military service. The study uses the 2022 Cooperative Election Study, a large, nationally representative pre-election and post-election survey administered online through Harvard University's Cooperative Election Study. The dataset includes over 50,000 Americans, including thousands of veterans. The analysis compares the views of veterans and nonveterans within the Republican and Democratic parties on policies including assault-weapon restrictions, publication of gun-owner information, and permitting teachers to carry firearms. Veterans within both parties often hold more moderate or otherwise distinctive positions than their nonveteran co-partisans, with the clearest differences appearing among Republicans.

Cummins, Carter. 2018. *Economic Perceptions and Political Tolerance in the United States and Canada*. This project asks whether unfavorable economic evaluations reduce citizens' willingness to protect political rights for groups they dislike and whether this relationship differs between the United States and Canada. Political tolerance is essential because democratic rights matter most when they protect unpopular speakers and dissenting organizations rather than only widely accepted groups. The study uses the U.S. and Canadian samples from the 2016-2017 AmericasBarometer, administered by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project through nationally representative country surveys. It examines support for dissenters' rights to vote, demonstrate, speak publicly, and use the media. Americans are generally less politically tolerant than Canadians, and negative economic perceptions more consistently reduce tolerance in the United States. The comparison demonstrates that similar economic concerns can have different democratic consequences depending on national context.

Curry, Peyton. 2025. *Local Television News and Civic Engagement*. This project asks whether watching local television news makes Americans more likely to vote, attend local political meetings, display political signs, or contact public officials. Political science has long found a tie between higher rates of media consumption and more political participation; however, the nature of media consumption is changing in the US. The question is significant because the decline of local newspapers and consolidation of television stations have raised concerns that citizens receive less information about their own communities even while consuming more national political news. The study uses the 2024 Cooperative Election Study, a nationally representative online panel of approximately 60,000 American adults. Its pre-election wave was fielded from October 1 through November 4 and its post-election wave from November 6 through December 10, 2024. Respondents are divided into those consuming only local television news, both local and other news, nonlocal news only, or no news. Local television alone does not consistently increase engagement; people consuming both local and nonlocal news are the most active across most civic behaviors.

Deane, Madison. 2023. *Fate, Randomness, and Economic Policy Attitudes*. This project asks how different explanations for poverty shape support for government assistance and whether scholars should distinguish fatalism from a belief in randomness. It separates the belief that uncontrolled events happen for a reason from the belief that bad outcomes can occur arbitrarily, a distinction that may explain why some people support a social safety net. The study merges Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 92, administered July 8-18, 2021, with Wave 96, administered September 20-26, 2021. Wave 92 supplies the measure of support for government assistance, while Wave 96 supplies measures of individualism, structuralism, fatalism, and randomness. The merged dataset contains 5,798 respondents; 5,280 appear on each variable in the initial construction, and 5,373 complete observations remain in the reported logistic regression. Individualists are less supportive of redistribution, structuralists are more supportive, and fatalism is not significant. Respondents attributing hardship to randomness are approximately 35 percent more likely to support redistributive policy than other Americans.

Dewan, Kate. 2023. *Do the Traditional Determinants of Support for Democracy Still Apply in Venezuela?* This project asks whether familiar explanations of democratic support still operate in Venezuela after years of polarization, economic crisis, and authoritarian deterioration. Venezuela is an especially useful case study to examine the determinants of democratic support because citizens may value democracy in principle even while their experience with institutions that are democratic in name only has been deeply disappointing. The study uses the Venezuelan sample from the 2020 Latinobarometro, and the analysis includes 1,198 Venezuelan respondents. It tests social capital, trust in political parties, education, economic evaluations, and prior experience with democratic government. Trust in political parties, greater educational attainment, positive evaluations of earlier democratic experience, and favorable economic assessments are associated with stronger democratic support. Several traditional explanations therefore remain relevant even in a setting where democratic institutions have been substantially weakened.

Evans, Cally. 2025. *Who Believes the United States Is Failing Basic Democratic Standards?* This project asks which Americans believe that the United States is failing to protect basic civil liberties and rights required for democracy to work. These liberties and rights include a national government that protects free expression, maintains an independent press, prevents political interference in law enforcement, and keeps government agencies from punishing political opponents. The study merges Bright Line Watch's April 2025 and September 2025 public-opinion surveys, stratified online panel surveys of 2,000 and 2,750 U.S. adults. The merged data contain 4,750 respondents, but randomized item assignment produces between 1,123 and 1,205 valid responses for each of the civil rights and liberties analyzed. Institutional concerns predict perceptions of democratic decline, but assessments are also strongly structured by party, ideology, gender, education, news engagement, and the political environment in which respondents were surveyed.

Fitzpatrick, James. 2025. *Social Media Platforms and Ideological Polarization: Is There a Link?* This project asks whether users of X/Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, and Instagram hold more ideologically extreme political positions than nonusers, whether the platforms differ in their polarizing associations, and whether consuming news on them produces additional polarization. The project distinguishes ideological extremity from affective hostility and compares four platforms rather than treating social media as a single experience. It merges Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 144, conducted March 18-24, 2024, with Wave 146, conducted April 8-14, 2024. Wave 144 surveyed 10,454 respondents about social-media and news use; Wave 146 surveyed 8,709 respondents about political beliefs; the merged analysis contains 7,756 respondents. Platform use and news consumption do not consistently predict ideological polarization. X/Twitter users are sometimes the most polarized, but the ranking varies by issue, and party, ideology, education, and race explain more than platform use.

Garrett, Shirley. 2019. *How Do African American Millennials View Race-Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education?* This project asks whether race or generation better explains (1) support for race-based affirmative action in higher education and (2) the belief that the present-day economic position of African Americans reflects the continuing effects of slavery and discrimination. The study considers three competing possibilities: race may remain the dominant influence; millennials of both races may converge because of generational change; or younger African Americans may support affirmative action less than older African Americans because opportunities have expanded or because such policies may cast doubt on the merit-based achievements of young African-Americans. The study uses the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a national survey of 54,535 adults. Garrett compares approximately 1,500 African American millennials, more than 5,000 African American non-millennials, 4,879 White millennials, and 34,548 White non-millennials. She finds that race is much more important predictor of the two dependent variables than generation. About 81 percent of African American millennials and 87 percent of older African Americans support affirmative action, compared with 32 percent of White millennials and 28 percent of older White Americans. African Americans in both generations are also much more likely than White respondents to attribute present-day disadvantage to the legacy of *de jure* segregation. The multivariate results confirm that generational differences exist within the African American sample, but they are much smaller than the racial divide.

George, Tyler. 2024. *Party Identification, Gender, and Political Pessimism in the United States.* This project asks whether women and men, and Republicans, Democrats, and independents, differ in their pessimism about the direction and future of the United States. The question matters because generalized pessimism can weaken political trust and encourage support for candidates who present politics as a struggle against national decline. The study uses the 2022 PRRI American Values Survey, a nationally representative survey of 2,523 U.S. adults conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute. It examines perceptions of the country's direction, evaluations of social change since the 1950s, and expectations for future generations. Party identification is the clearest predictor: Republicans report substantially greater pessimism than Democrats and independents. Gender differences are generally

not statistically significant, showing that political identity does more to organize pessimistic assessments than the demographic distinction initially emphasized.

Gesell, Ryan. 2025. *Assessing the Current Drivers of Satisfaction with Democracy*. This project asks which widely discussed explanations best account for Americans' dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working. Rather than studying a single possible cause, it compares out-party status, economic perceptions, inequality, nativism, perceived threats to free speech, and age in a common model. The study uses Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 145, a nationally representative survey of 3,600 U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024; approximately 66 percent report some dissatisfaction with democracy. Poor evaluations of the national economy are the most powerful predictor: respondents who view the economy negatively are roughly seven times more likely to report dissatisfaction. Republicans and independents, then outside the incumbent president's party, are also more dissatisfied. Perceived threats to free speech are especially important among the very dissatisfied, while being under 30 contributes comparatively little.

Gould, Jack. 2023. *Why Do Americans View China and Russia as Enemies?* This project asks how partisanship, religiosity and denomination, economic vulnerability, and attention to foreign affairs determine whether Americans classify China or Russia as enemies rather than partners or competitors. Distinguishing among these explanations matters because public threat perceptions can constrain foreign-policy choices and may reflect domestic political identities more than actual exposure to international threats. The analysis uses public opinion data from a national Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey conducted in spring 2022. Party identification and interest in foreign affairs are the most consequential predictors of attitudes toward both countries. Religion has less influence than anticipated, while respondents' economic circumstances are generally insignificant. The models explain only a limited portion of the variation, suggesting that perceptions of foreign adversaries cannot be reduced to a small set of demographic and partisan characteristics.

Hollinger, Justin. 2024. *How Religious Denomination and Religiosity Shape American National Identity*. This project asks whether Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, and secular Americans differ in the characteristics they consider necessary for someone to be 'truly American.' The study uses the 2021 PRRI American Values Survey, a nationally representative survey of 2,508 U.S. adults conducted on September 30, 2021. The focal groups include 485 Evangelical Protestants, 423 Mainline Protestants, 570 Roman Catholics, and 628 secular respondents. Roman Catholics are most likely to prioritize American birth and Western European heritage, while Evangelicals are especially likely to regard Christianity as important. Secular respondents consistently hold the most inclusive views on who should be considered as being fully American. Conversely, strong personal religious identity independently increases the likelihood of endorsing exclusionary criteria, while respect for laws and institutions receives broad support across all groups.

Jefferson, Aaron. 2019. *Evangelical Faith and Veterans' Support for the Use of Military Force Abroad*. This project asks whether Evangelical veterans are more supportive than non-Evangelical veterans of an active and forceful U.S. role abroad. It examines general international engagement, overwhelming force against terrorism, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, drone strikes, and nation-building. The study uses Pew Research Center's 2011 War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era, a survey of 1,853 U.S. military veterans published October 5, 2011. The sample includes 557 Evangelical veterans and 1,296 non-Evangelical veterans; the additive hawkishness index has 1,687 valid observations, and the listwise-complete multivariate sample contains 1,559 respondents. Evangelicals appear more hawkish in initial comparisons, but party identification, ideology, and age explain more once controls are introduced. Evangelical identity consequently has limited independent influence on support for military force, drone strikes, or nation-building.

Kauffman, McKenzie. 2023. *Why Do Americans Think Social Media Harms Democracy?* This project asks what leads Americans to conclude that social media harms democracy. It distinguishes the effects of using the internet and posting political material from judgments that online spaces spread misinformation, division, and incivility. The study uses the U.S. sample from Pew Research Center's Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, fielded March 21-27, 2022, among 3,581 U.S. adults. Frequent internet use and posting political or social content do not increase negative evaluations and are sometimes associated with more positive views. The strongest predictors of thinking that social media use harms democracy are believing that social media increases division, false information, and uncivil behavior, along with dissatisfaction with democracy. Perceived consequences therefore matter more than simple exposure.

Lancaster, Aidan. 2022. *Social Mobility Expectations in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.* This project asks why citizens of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico differ in optimism that their children will be financially better off than they are. Intergenerational optimism is politically significant because it can influence support for existing economic arrangements even when current inequality or hardship is substantial. The analysis uses the 2020 Latinobarometro Public Opinion Survey, administered through nationally representative, face-to-face interviews. The study includes 1,200 Argentine, 1,204 Brazilian, and 1,202 Mexican respondents and tests social privilege, openness to change, economic position, democratic satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and perceptions of progress, corruption, and inequality. These conventional explanations account for surprisingly little variation in expectations. The largely null findings are useful because they show that anticipated demographic and attitudinal predictors do not adequately explain intergenerational economic optimism in these countries.

Lattimore, Nathan. 2025. *How Civic Are Religious 'Nones' in America?* This project asks whether religiously unaffiliated Americans who retain some religious exposure differ from fully secular 'nones' in civic engagement and political trust. The study uses the 2023 PRRI Gen Z Survey, conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute in partnership with Ipsos through its probability-based KnowledgePanel from August through September 2023. The nationally representative dataset includes 5,860 adults from all generations. Nones who sometimes pray exhibit significantly more civic engagement, in some cases even exceeding religious identifiers; nones with no religious exposure show the least engagement. Complete nonexposure to religious influence is also the clearest predictor of lower institutional trust. Secularization therefore does not have a uniform civic consequence.

Mahachek, Sophia. 2021. *What Leads the French to Support Different International Security Organizations?* This project asks why French citizens support the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations and whether the same predictors explain support equally well across organizations with different purposes and relationships to France. The core hypothesis is that French citizens may be more or less supportive of international institutions, depending on how much say France has in the decisions of an institution and its historical role in protecting French security and interests. The study uses the French subsample of Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes and Trends Summer 2020 dataset, collected from June through August 2020; the analysis includes 1,051 French respondents. It tests demographics, political orientation, internationalism, confidence in President Emmanuel Macron, and generalized interpersonal trust. Confidence in Macron and the belief that most people can be trusted are the strongest recurring predictors. Favorability is highest for the EU at 63 percent, followed by the UN at 61 percent and NATO at 50 percent, showing both common and institution-specific patterns.

Maloney, Maggie. 2024. *Gender, Protest Participation, and Perceptions of Protest Risk.* This project asks whether women and men differ in their likelihood of participating in political protests and in their concerns about arrest, police violence, and violence from fellow participants or counterprotesters. The study uses the Social Policy Institute's Socioeconomic Impacts of COVID-19 Survey, administered online in five waves from April 2020 through June 2021. The dataset contains 5,033 respondents, including 2,572 women and 2,437

men. Approximately 690 respondents reported participating in an organized protest, march, or demonstration; between 733 and 734 protest participants answered the follow-up risk questions. Women and men report nearly identical raw participation rates, but after controls are included, being female reduces the odds of having protested by 33.2 percent. Among people who did protest, however, women are less likely than nonwomen to express concern about arrest, police violence, or participant violence. Race, age, ideology, and education also shape participation or risk perceptions.

McCambridge, Megan. 2024. *How Emotions Shape Trust in Government and Support for Public Health Action*. This project asks whether hope, pride, anger, and fear have distinguishable effects on trust in the federal government, generally, and support for governmental involvement in public health, in particular. The question is significant because emotions may influence citizens independently of party or ideology and may produce different reactions depending on whether the outcome involves institutional trust or demand for protection. The study uses Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 107, conducted in 2022 among a nationally representative online panel of U.S. adults. Hope and pride are associated with greater trust in the federal government, while anger reduces trust. Fear produces a more complicated result: fearful respondents are more supportive of federal involvement in public health than expected. The findings demonstrate that negative emotions do not have uniform political effects and that fear can increase demand for government action even when other negative emotions erode confidence.

Moon, Avery. 2019. *How Americans and Canadians Define National Belonging*. This project asks whether Americans and Canadians use different criteria to determine who genuinely belongs to their nation and whether any national difference remains after demographic and ideological characteristics are considered. The study uses the Pew Research Center Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, which interviewed approximately 23,500 people in 19 countries from March through July 2016. Moon analyzes 1,003 respondents in the United States and 1,020 in Canada. Americans are more likely to consider birthplace, command of the national language, and Christianity important to national identity, while Canadians are slightly more likely to emphasize shared customs and traditions. After nationality and individual characteristics are considered together, education, Christianity, conservatism, and generation explain more of the variation than a generalized national 'essence,' except for the difference involving customs and traditions.

Moore, Johanna. 2020. *What Causes Individuals to Support Democracy? A Study of Algeria and Sudan*. This project asks whether economic evaluations, perceptions of corruption, age, and views about religion in politics explain democratic support in Algeria and Sudan, two North African countries. The comparison is useful because both countries have recently experienced substantial instability and protest, yet their institutional and social environments otherwise differ. The study uses Afrobarometer Round 6 survey data collected in Algeria and Sudan in 2015, with approximately 2,400 respondents across the two nationally representative country samples. The analysis considers whether younger citizens, respondents dissatisfied with economic performance, and those concerned about corruption are especially supportive of democracy. The findings identify corruption concerns and economic dissatisfaction as important correlates of democratic support, emphasizing that citizens' evaluations of governance performance are closely connected to their commitment to democratic rule.

Nemanic, Hannah. 2021. *Do Perceived Democratic Failures Increase Support for Fundamental Governmental Change?* This project asks whether Americans who want fundamental changes to the national government are reacting to specific democratic failures or merely expressing generalized dissatisfaction. It tests perceptions that checks and balances are failing, Americans' vote choices do not matter for what government does, and the belief that Americans lack equal opportunities to prosper. The study uses Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 71, a probability-based online survey completed July 27-August 2, 2020, by 11,001 adults. The analysis uses only the 5,501 respondents who

received the relevant questions for all of the study's key variables. Believing that aspects of American democracy are failing increases the probability of supporting changes to the American political system. In fact, each perceived failure significantly increases support for structural change, with the absence of equal opportunity providing the strongest individual predictor. Believing that two or three democratic principles are failing substantially increases the probability of favoring fundamental change.

Nguyen, Amanda. 2022. *Asian American and Latino Attitudes Toward Police Reform*. This project asks whether Asian Americans and Latinos, and ethnic subgroups including Chinese Americans and Mexican Americans, differ in their support for police reform. The subgroup comparison is critical because broad racial categories can conceal differences in the immigration history of different Asian and Latino subgroups, unique subgroup experiences with law enforcement, and varying degrees of political incorporation. The project uses the 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a nationally representative online survey administered by YouGov. It examines support for banning police chokeholds, reducing police funding, demilitarizing police departments, and allowing lawsuits against officers who recklessly disregard individual rights. Among non-whites, African Americans—the overall comparison group—are the most supportive of police reforms, while Asian Americans are generally more supportive of reform than Latinos. Contrary to the initial expectation, Chinese Americans do not consistently differ from other Asian Americans; however, Mexican Americans are more supportive than other Latinos on several police reforms.

Oakley, Mack. 2024. *Support for Democracy among Houthis and Non-Houthis in Yemen*. This project asks why some Yemenis continue to support democracy despite obvious problems with the way democracy works in their country, which is experiencing civil war, weak institutions, and the presence of a powerful armed movement. The study compares support for democracy among Houthis and non-Houthis and examines how various factors shape support, including education level, social trust, political confidence, and attitudes toward Sharia and religious governance. The study uses the Yemeni sample from Arab Barometer Wave V, collected in 2018-2019 through a regional survey program measuring political and social attitudes across the Middle East and North Africa. Support for democracy remains unexpectedly strong among many Yemenis. Education, social trust, and attitudes toward religious governance all help explain variation, indicating that prolonged conflict does not eliminate democratic commitments but changes the conditions under which they are sustained.

Parson, Hannah. 2023. *Historical and Contemporary Forms of Racial Resentment*. This project asks why some Americans are more skeptical than others of ideas such as white privilege, racial inequality, and efforts to teach or discuss the history of slavery and racism. The question is important because debates about race increasingly focus not on overt prejudice but on disagreements about whether discrimination continues to shape opportunities and outcomes in contemporary American society. The study's central focus is how well theories and predictors long used to explain individual differences in "implicit racism" and "anti-Black animus" can also explain contemporary views on race-related issues. The analyses use Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel Wave 92, a national survey of 10,221 adults conducted July 8–18, 2021. Statistical tests examine whether party identification, political ideology, views about government's role in society, nationalism, nostalgia for the past, and demographic characteristics help explain present-day attitudes toward racial issues. The findings show that Conservatives and Republicans are much more likely than other Americans to reject concepts such as White privilege and systemic racism, while liberals and Democrats are more likely to view racial inequality as an ongoing problem. Attitudes toward government's role in the economy, national identity, and social change also help explain views of white privilege, racial inequality, and efforts to teach young Americans about the history of slavery and racism. The project concludes that disagreements about race are closely connected to broader political and ideological divisions in contemporary American politics.

Pipta, Sophia. 2025. *Authoritarian Populism, National Belonging, and Identity in Latin America*. This project asks whether support for authoritarian leadership in Argentina and Brazil leads citizens to adopt narrower definitions of who truly belongs to the nation. These specific countries were selected for analysis because of their many similarities and two key differences. While they are both large Latin American countries with a history that includes bureaucratic military rule, Argentina's population is largely made up of descendants of immigrants who arrived in the 19th and early 20th century; in contrast, Afro-Brazilians are the largest ethnic group in Brazil and European immigration was both less extensive and more regionally isolated in Brazil. The study focuses on what kind of citizens in the two settings believe that a person's birthplace, ability to speak the national language, and participation in national traditions determine whether they are truly members of the nation. The study uses the Argentine and Brazilian samples from Pew Research Center's Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey, fielded through telephone and face-to-face interviews in 2023. Each national sample contains approximately 1,000 adults, producing a combined dataset of about 2,036 respondents. Authoritarian sympathies are associated with more restrictive criteria for belonging, but the relationships differ between the two national contexts. The results are generally stronger in Brazil, where cultural and traditional criteria play a more prominent role.

Quattrucci, Tessa. 2022. *How Does Threatened Masculinity Influence Attitudes About Fairness?* This project asks whether Americans who believe that men are punished merely for behaving like men are more likely to defend existing social and economic arrangements as being appropriate and fair. Specifically, the study examines how beliefs about contemporary masculinity correlate to Americans' views about general fairness, support for redistribution, and the belief that white Americans experience discrimination comparable to that faced by racial minorities. The study uses the 2020 PRRI American Values Survey, a nationally representative survey of 2,538 American adults conducted from September 9 through September 22, 2020. Perceived threats to masculinity significantly predict system-justifying attitudes across the dependent variables. The strongest association concerns race: respondents who see masculinity as threatened are especially likely to also believe that white Americans experience discrimination comparable to minority groups.

Quimby, Zach. 2019. *Religious Identity, Presidential Character, and Performance Approval*. This project asks whether religious and secular Americans apply different character standards when judging presidents and whether these groups' perceptions of character shape performance approval differently during the Obama and Trump administrations. The study uses two national Pew Research Center surveys, one fielded during the Obama administration and one during the Trump administration, comparing the views of secular respondents, Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and Evangelical Protestants. Perceptions of presidential character are among the most powerful predictors of performance approval and can exceed party identification in explanatory importance. Contrary to expectations, religious and secular Americans do not differ dramatically in how strongly character evaluations influence approval, suggesting a broadly shared, though politically conditioned, evaluative process.

Rhodes, Brantley. 2021. *Student Loans, Partisanship, Education, and Support for Education Spending*. This project asks whether personally holding student-loan debt increases support for greatly expanding government spending on education and whether that relationship varies by educational attainment or party identification. The study uses the 2020 Cooperative Election Study Common Content, a nationally representative online survey of 61,000 U.S. adults, with 9.8 percent of the sample reporting responsibility for a student loan. The analysis compares borrowers and nonborrowers across educational and partisan subgroups. Overall, borrowers are 54 percent more likely than otherwise similar nonborrowers to favor greatly increased education spending by the government. Student debt adds approximately 9 percentage points to support among Republicans and 11 points among Democrats, showing that direct economic experience adds explanatory power beyond party when it comes to supporting education.

Rodriguez, Policarpo. 2018. *Who Supports Regime Change in Contemporary Venezuela?* This project asks which Venezuelans are most supportive of replacing the Maduro government and whether support for regime change is driven by economic deterioration, corruption, crime, or feelings of political exclusion. The study uses the Venezuelan sample from the 2016 Latinobarometro, a nationally representative regional survey administered by Corporacion Latinobarometro. Respondents who perceive severe economic decline, widespread corruption, weak political responsiveness, and insecurity are more supportive of replacing the regime. The project concludes that contemporary Venezuela exhibits several conditions resembling those that facilitated Hugo Chavez's earlier rise, illustrating how unmet material and institutional demands can undermine an incumbent political order even when citizens are divided over which ideological alternatives are best.

Rosillo, Christopher. 2024. *Do Mexican Americans Differ from Other Latinos on Immigration Policy?* This project asks whether Mexican Americans differ from Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Central Americans in their views of border security, refugees, protections for immigrants brought to the country as children, and deportation. The core expectation is that different Latino sub-groups should have varying views because of the historical specifics of where their group came from as well as the extent to which difference types of immigration policies adversely impact their group today. The study uses Pew Research Center's 2022 National Survey of Latinos, conducted through American Trends Panel Wave 113 from August 1 through August 14, 2022. The full survey contains 7,647 respondents; Rosillo analyzes 3,029 Latino adults, of whom 53.7 percent identify as Mexican, 8.6 percent as Puerto Rican, 5.8 percent as Cuban, and 11.8 percent as Central American. Mexicans are less supportive than Puerto Ricans and Cubans of increased border security, but do not consistently hold the least restrictive position across other policies. In multivariate analysis, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are significantly more supportive than Mexicans of increased border security, while Central Americans do not differ significantly. Party identification and citizenship status often explain more of the support for different immigrant-restricting policies than national-origin subgroup.

Rothermel, Ethan J. 2024. *White Christian Nationalism: More Than the Sum of Its Constituent Parts.* This project asks whether media and public discussions exaggerate the prevalence of White Christian Nationalism (WCN) by treating anyone who is White, Christian, and nationalist as a member of a coherent extremist movement associated with discrimination, racial violence, and radical policy preferences. The distinction matters because WCN is a specific ideology concerning the religious and racial foundations of the United States, not merely a collection of demographic identities and patriotic attitudes. The paper uses national public-opinion measures that distinguish White racial identity, Evangelical affiliation, nationalism, conservatism, and endorsement of core White Christian Nationalist principles. The research finds that these characteristics frequently overlap but are not interchangeable. Many White Evangelicals and highly patriotic conservatives do not endorse WCN's defining claims, while some Americans who lack one or more of those identifying characteristics nonetheless embrace its central ideas. The project concludes that careful measurement of White Christian Nationalism is essential both for estimating its actual prevalence and for determining how strongly adherence predicts other attitudes and behaviors. When studies include large numbers of nonadherents in their working definition of White Christian Nationalists, they may overestimate the prevalence of WCN while underestimating its effects.

Rubano, Arianna. 2024. *Do the Traditional Predictors of Patriotism Operate Differently among Younger Americans?* *This project asks whether race, religiosity, trust, and partisanship influence patriotism differently among younger Americans than among older generations. The question is significant because declining expressions of national pride among younger adults may reflect changing demographic compositions across generations, weaker religious affiliation among younger Americans, differences in partisan identities, or a genuinely varying generational understandings of patriotism.* The study uses national public-opinion data containing measures of patriotism together with demographic,

religious, political, and trust variables and compares younger respondents with older cohorts. The principal finding is that the conventional predictors of patriotism operate among younger adults in broadly the same ways that they operate among older Americans. Race, religiosity, political trust, and party identification remain consequential. The generational decline in patriotism therefore does not appear to arise from an entirely new set of causes.

Schimmel, Erica. 2018. *Anti-Globalization Attitudes and Support for Alternative Regime Types*. This project asks whether people who are hostile to globalization become less committed to representative democracy and more receptive to direct democracy, rule by experts, or strong leaders unconstrained by legislatures and courts. The study uses the 2017 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey, focusing on respondents in the United States, France, and Hungary. These cases provide variation in political institutions and exposure to anti-globalization and populist appeals. Respondents with stronger anti-globalization attitudes are generally more open to alternative forms of governance and especially to systems placing fewer institutional constraints on political leaders. The findings suggest that globalization attitudes extend beyond trade or immigration preferences and can be connected to more fundamental beliefs about how governments should be structured.

Selman, Maggie. 2023. *Religion, Science, Personal Contact, and Attitudes Toward Transgender Rights*. This project asks whether religion, science, and personal contact serve as competing sources of information that shape attitudes toward transgender civil rights and body-related protections. The analysis uses a Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey fielded in May 2022. Religious influence is associated with greater hostility toward both civil protections and body-related rights. Scientific influence is associated with less opposition to civil protections but, unexpectedly, greater resistance to requiring insurance coverage for gender-related medical care. Personal contact with trans individuals does not significantly predict civil-rights attitudes but is associated with lower hostility toward body-related protections. Political ideology remains more powerful than the three knowledge sources across the models, demonstrating that information, religion, and experience operate within a heavily politicized context.

Stigler, Trinity. 2025. *Who Supports Technocracy? American Attitudes Toward Expert- Led Governance*. This project asks what kinds of Americans support allowing experts rather than elected officials to make major policy decisions. The question is important because so many aspects of American government are carried out by unelected elites, including most military action, the Federal Reserve's direction of the economy, and the Supreme Court's ability to interpret and even overturn the actions of elected officials. The study uses the U.S. sample of the Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, containing 1,505 American respondents; 1,486 answer the technocracy item, and the listwise-complete logistic regression uses 1,384 observations. Approximately 37 percent of Americans rate expert rule favorably. Party identification and government distrust do not independently produce the expected relationships. Younger adults, racial minorities, women, lower-income respondents, people with negative economic evaluations, and those without four-year degrees are more receptive to technocracy. Demographic and economic experience therefore matter more than the anticipated partisan divide.

Thompson, Dylan. 2021. *Domestic Dissatisfaction and Support for Foreign Authoritarian Leaders*. This project asks whether dissatisfaction with one's democracy, political system, and economy, together with weak commitment to free speech, makes citizens of Western democracies more favorable toward Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin. The central expectation is that citizens in democracies who do not see their system as valuable and effective will be more likely to support autocrats elsewhere. The study uses the Pew Research Center Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey and analyzes nationally representative samples totaling 4,548 respondents: 2,015 in Germany, 1,030 in Poland, and 1,503 in the United States. Valid outcome responses number 4,371 for Vladimir Putin and 3,914 for Xi Jinping. The hypothesized relationships are not consistent across countries or leaders. Dissatisfaction with democracy predicts favorable views of

Putin in Germany but not uniformly elsewhere; many relationships run opposite to expectations in Poland and the United States.

Toth, Mason. 2024. *How Discrimination Shapes Muslim American Party Affiliation*. This project asks whether experiences of discrimination move Muslim Americans toward the Democratic Party and whether that relationship strengthened after the political controversies surrounding the 2017 travel restrictions commonly called the Muslim Ban. The study compares national surveys of Muslim Americans conducted in 2011 and 2017, which include party identification, perceived discrimination, and relevant demographic and religious measures. Muslim Americans reporting discrimination are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. The association is particularly apparent in the 2017 data, following heightened attention to anti-Muslim rhetoric and federal travel restrictions. The results suggest that discriminatory experiences can reshape partisan attachment rather than merely changing opinions on a single policy.

Vaughn, Dalton. 2023. *Why Are Brazilians Questioning the Value of Democracy?* This project asks how social capital, institutional confidence, economic evaluations, insecurity, and perceptions of individual-level views of corruption explain support for democracy in Brazil. The study uses the 2021 LAPOP AmericasBarometer Brazil Questionnaire and fielded from May 25 through June 30, 2021, among a nationally representative sample of voting-age Brazilians. Economic evaluations and personal-security perceptions are not statistically significant in the full model. Education is the strongest predictor of democratic support, followed by news consumption, perceptions of corruption, and trust in neighbors. The results emphasize civic information, social trust, and perceived institutional integrity rather than immediate economic or security conditions.

Warren, Samantha. 2021. *Why Does Support for Coups Differ between Mexico and Argentina?* This project asks why support for military and executive coups is much higher in Mexico than in Argentina and whether familiar individual-level predictors operate similarly in the two countries. The study uses the Mexican and Argentine samples from the 2018-2019 AmericasBarometer, administered in person by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project. The full survey covers 31,050 respondents in 20 countries; Warren's analytic sample includes 3,108 people, consisting of 1,580 respondents in Mexico and 1,528 in Argentina. Lower education and residence in Mexico are the strongest predictors. Mexicans remain more supportive of coups across many demographic and attitudinal categories rather than merely having more individuals with conventionally pro-coup characteristics. The persistent national gap suggests that historical experience, including Argentina's direct exposure to military dictatorship both historically and within recent memory, helps shape coup attitudes.

Webb, Tessa. 2022. *Why Do Some Americans View Voting as a Privilege Rather Than a Right? This project asks why some Americans view voting as an inherent right while others see it as a privilege that may be conditioned or restricted*. The study uses Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 92, conducted July 8-18, 2021, and analyzes party, ideology, education, gender, and views of racial inequality. The strongest predictor of defining voting as a right is acknowledging that White Americans receive societal advantages, a relationship even stronger than partisanship. The project also finds that education and gender operate differently among Republicans, Democrats, and independents. Americans' conceptions of voting are therefore shaped both by partisan identity and by broader beliefs about equality and the distribution of political and social power.

von Windheim, Thilo. 2022. *Twitter Use and Perceptions of Its Benefits for Democracy*. This project asks which uses and perceived effects of Twitter lead Americans to believe that the platform benefits democracy. The study uses Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 90, a national online survey fielded May 17-31, 2021, among 2,548 adult respondents. Using Twitter to stay informed and believing that it increases public awareness are the strongest predictors of viewing the platform as democratically beneficial.

Following politicians is not independently significant once other behaviors and demographic characteristics are controlled. Informational use and perceived civic consequences therefore matter more than exposure to political accounts alone.

Zapien, Nicolette. 2024. *Who Supports Reforming the Electoral College, Supreme Court, and Senate Filibuster?* This project asks whether the same Americans support major changes to the way American government works across three very different political institutions. Zapien also explores whether party, demographics, perceived governmental neglect, or political anger best explains Americans' preferences for different types of major reforms. The study uses the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group's nationally representative 2020 Voter Survey. It tests how party identification, state population, gender, race, religion, perceived governmental neglect, and anger toward politics shape support for specific reforms. Democrats are more supportive of reform across all three institutions. Women, African Americans, and respondents outside Christian traditions are also generally more reform-oriented, although these relationships vary by the type of reform examined. Political anger emerges as one of the most consistent predictors, suggesting that reform preferences are connected both to group position and dissatisfaction with how government operates.