Donald Trump Voters and Support for Gender Equality

Mark Setzler Professor of Political Science, High Point University msetzler@highpoint.edu

Alixandra B. Yanus Assistant Professor of Political Science, High Point University ayanus@highpoint.edu

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Abstract

The 2016 election of President Donald Trump appears to have given voice to the preferences and aspirations of a segment of the American population that has long felt underrepresented and disenfranchised by national political leaders. In this paper, we explore the potential consequences of this mobilization for future policymaking on gender equality. Specifically, we use data from a survey administered shortly before the November 2016 election to examine whether the same demographic and ideological characteristics that led so many voters to support Donald Trump are correlated with attitudes contrary to gender equality. Our analysis reveals evidence of a relationship between Republican Party identification, racial animus, authoritarian attitudes and holding patriarchal views. Although the magnitude and significance of these factors vary across different measures of gender equality, our findings indicate that there is cause for concern among supporters of women's rights about the demands Trump supporters may place on government.

Very few political scientists anticipated that Donald Trump would win the November 2016 presidential election. Post-election research indicates that two factors were particularly influential on these expectations. First, analysts misjudged Trump's ability to mobilize certain types of voters. Polling firms' likely-voter models generally underestimated his chances of motivating low-information voters as well as the enthusiasm of his strongest supporters. President Trump's candidacy resonated even better than anticipated with white, non-millennial, Republican males without a college education (Pew 2016). He also did unexpectedly well in areas with high shares of religious, blue-collar, and rural voters, even in states presumed to be solidly Democratic. Finally, even when running against other Republicans in the primary election, Trump performed exceptionally well in securing the support of individuals who expressed racial animus and authoritarian views (MacWilliams 2016a, 2016b; Cohn 2015).

A second reason that Trump surprised nearly all political observers was that most analysts concluded weeks in advance of the election that he was unlikely to gain anywhere near the support he would need from female Republicans, let alone women voters as a whole (e.g., Rucker 2016). Polls showed Hillary Clinton with a thin, but consistent lead as the campaign closed, reinforcing the idea that no candidate could possibly overcome damage done to Trump with the release of an audio recording in which he had bragged in lurid detail about his celebrity status allowing him to sexually assault women without repercussions. Trump appeared to harm his campaign even further when several of his victims came forward with stories of his sexism and inappropriate behavior, charges to which Trump responded by threatening to sue his accusers and renewing his call for an end to "this political correct crap" (Gass 2015).

Whether Trump's victory will prove to be a lasting realignment of the Republican Party's electoral base remains to be seen. However, the fact that over 60 million Americans—including 46 percent of women (Roberts and Ely 2016)—cast their ballots for an overtly sexist candidate who showed no interest in promoting gender equality in any of his policy promises raises important questions about what his victory may tell us about levels of support for gender equality more generally in the United States. Specifically, does Trump's election represent a reconfiguration of the electorate in ways that will hinder future efforts to work toward female equality?

Our paper explores one aspect of this larger question: how do the individual-level attributes most strongly linked to supporting Donald Trump in the 2016 general election correspond with support for gender equality? In other words, we ask if the mobilization of Trump's electoral base together with his boorish messaging about women have mobilized and empowered a group of voters who are less supportive of women's rights than other Americans. To explore this question, we use data from a national survey administered shortly before the 2016 election. We analyze the influence of various demographic factors, party identification, authoritarian beliefs, and racial animus on the probability of voting for Trump as well as three different measures of support for gender equality. These include believing that women lead as well as men, agreeing that it is important to continue to fight for women's rights, and rejecting the idea that men and women are best suited for different types of jobs.

Who Were Trump's Voters, and What Do They Think about Gender Equality?

Commentators have described the demographic coalition that delivered victory to President Donald Trump as a newly codified, activated group of citizens previously overlooked by politicians, pollsters, and political activists (Confessore and Cohn 2016; Olsen 2016). The truth, however, is that political scientists have recognized the distinctiveness of the block of blue-collar, white, religious, males who are not college educated for at least fifteen years. Democratic pollster Celinda Lake first identified these so-called NASCAR Dads during the early 2000s. While commentators initially described these voters as being a potentially decisive swing vote, they did not turn out to be one in practice. Though their traditionalistic worldview has always been cohesive, their voting patterns and participation were not, leading scholars and strategists to dismiss their relevance for predicting electoral outcomes (e.g. Greene and Elder 2007).

In 2016, however, a non-traditional candidate emerged to give a stronger and more distinct voice to these God, family, and country value voters. This plain-speaking candidate promised to "make America great again" by bringing jobs to the Rustbelt, keeping the "bad hombres" in Mexico, ridding decadent cities of their rampant crime, and cutting taxes for all Americans. Ironically, of course, the candidate articulating these issues was also a misogynistic New York City capitalist, who had made his life's work bankrupting casinos, employing (and marrying) immigrants, paying as little as possible in income taxes, and starring on a reality television show where he weekly bellowed, "you're fired" at people. He was a Washington outsider of the highest order, defying norms, questioning the status quo, and bump drafting other Republican candidates like Dale Earnhardt in the fourth turn at Talladega. This candidate, of course, was Donald Trump, and with help from his political strategists, he managed not only to appeal to both the NASCAR Dads and their spouses, but also to inspire these angry voters to turn out to vote in key states on Election Day. While his new coalition was not enough to win the national popular vote, post-election punditry pointed to this block of voters as being the keystone to Trump's Electoral College victory.

Trump voters, however, had more in common than their presidential vote choice and profound desire for backwards-looking economic change. Previous research has documented that Republican, blue-collar, white, religious, males, who are not college educated are distinguished by their attitudes privileging patriarchy, Christianity, and patriotism (Vavrus 2007). Scholars have shown that Republicans and more religious Americans are more likely than their less-religious peers to hold attitudes questioning the appropriateness of female political leaders (Setzler and Yanus 2016; Davis and Greenstein 2009). For example, data from one 2008 Pew Research Center survey revealed that only 13 percent of Democrats, but 29 percent of Republicans believed men made better political leaders than women. Similarly, 25 percent of those who attended services weekly versus 18 percent of those who attended services less frequently expressed this viewpoint (Setzler and Yanus 2016).

In addition to sharing various demographic characteristics, Trump's strongest supporters in 2016 were also united by two other characteristics: high levels of racial animus and authoritarian predispositions (MacWilliams 2016a, 2016b; Cohn 2015).¹ These characteristics, too, typically correlate with attitudes opposing full equality for women. The link between racial hostility and sexism is well documented in the psychological literature. Studies conducted over the last forty years repeatedly have uncovered strong positive correlations between racism, sexism, and homophobia for all respondents (e.g. Aosved, Long, and Voller 2009; Sidanius 1992; Henley and Pincus 1978). These relationships are especially powerful among men, religious individuals, less-educated individuals, and those with conservative political viewpoints. However, even after controlling for these variables, racism and sexism, in particular, exhibit a strong residual correlation (Sidanius 1992).

Authoritarianism is, perhaps, an even stronger predictor of attitudes that espouse traditional gender roles. Both men and women who have authoritarian personalities express a preference for a world with clearly delineated gender roles and rigid conceptualizations of the masculine and the feminine (Peterson and Zurbriggen 2010). Authoritarian personalities are more likely to demonstrate skepticism toward working women (Christopher and Wojda 2008) and a resistance to new experiences (Ekehammar et al. 2004).

¹ Some readers may suggest that racism and authoritarianism are similar constructs. However, previous research has demonstrated that the correlation between these two indicators is extremely weak. These effects, thus, are "primarily additive, rather than interactive in nature" (Sibley, Robertson, and Wilson 2006: 755).

Hypotheses

Our primary objective in this analysis is to explore the extent to which the same demographic and ideological characteristics that led voters to support Donald Trump are correlated with attitudes that run contrary to gender equality. Thus, we posit three specific hypotheses.

Our first hypothesis relates to the political and demographic characteristics of likely Trump voters in the 2016 election. Specifically, exit polling data and other analyses have demonstrated that Trump's candidacy resonated particularly well with white, non-millennial, Republican males without college educations (Pew 2016). He also did especially well in areas with high shares of religious, blue-collar, and rural voters. Previous analyses of attitudes regarding gender equality have demonstrated that individuals who identify with these demographic groups also will be more resistant to full gender equality than other Americans (Setzler and Yanus 2016, 2015). Thus, we posit:

H1: Republican, white, male, rural, blue collar, and religious respondents— the demographic factors linked to stereotypical Trump supporters and pro-Trump regions as a whole—will also be less supportive of women's equality.

Trump's candidacy—even during the Republican primaries—also had particular appeal for two additional types of people: individuals with authoritarian personalities and high levels of racial animus (MacWilliams 2016a, 2016b; Cohn 2015). The social and political psychology literatures richly document the strong the relationship between these traits and attitudes opposing gender equality (Peterson and Zurbriggen 2010; Aosved, Long, and Voller 2009; Christopher and Wojda 2008; Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt 2007; Ekehammar et al. 2004; Sidanius 1992; Henley and Pincus 1978). Thus, as with demographic indicators, we expect that voters with these dispositions also will be disproportionately inclined to express views that oppose gender equality. Specifically:

H2: Individuals with more authoritarian personalities will be less supportive of women's equality.

H3: Individuals that express higher levels of racial animus will be less supportive of women's equality.

Data and Measurement

The data that we use to test these hypotheses come from a survey administered to likely voters on October 2 and 3, 2016. Researchers at ClearerThinking.org collected the data from a 942-subject pool that was recruited and compensated through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service (Greenberg 2016b).² Although MTurk samples only include individuals who have opted into MTurk and offered to complete surveys for nominal payment, social scientists have published a vast and growing number of studies using these samples (for partial summaries, see: Crawford and Pilanski 2014; Gerber et al. 2016; and Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner 2015). Researchers comparing response patterns of MTurk respondents to samples from RDD phone and in-person surveys have found that MTurk respondent pools typically are not exactly representative of the national population, but they better reflect the general population than other types of convenience samples and Internet surveys frequently used in studies of political psychology and in political experiments (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). Importantly for this study, liberals and conservatives in MTurk samples closely mirror the psychological divisions of liberals and conservatives in the mass public (Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner, 2015).

Obtaining MTurk samples that will allow researchers to reliably examine public opinion typically requires researchers to either oversample certain populations or to use post-stratification weighting. Specifically, MTurk samples need to be adjusted to account for the fact that they typically over-represent unmarried, modestly less affluent, urban, renting, and younger respondents. They also consistently and heavily over-represent liberals, Democrats, and non-religious Americans (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016). While demographic and political discrepancies from the U.S. population as a whole can be addressed by post-hoc weighting to match the sample to Census Bureau and representative national population surveys, under-representation in MTurk samples is best tackled by oversampling and prescreening surveys (Conner and Tingley 2015). For the subject pool in this study, ClearerThinking.org employed prescreening questions to generate a sample that faithfully represented national polling averages for the major candidates a month before the 2016 election. The decision to make the sample more representative in this way had the effect of drawing in

² The survey's methodology is explained in Greenberg 2016b (see study 2's explanation), while the data was downloaded from links at Greenberg 2016a. Further details on the survey's methodology and the manner in which its respondent pool was matched to and verified against national RDD surveys were obtained by the authors in direct correspondence with Spencer Greenberg.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Full-range dependent variables				
Women not equally good leaders	1.945	1.410	1	7
Not important to fight for equality	2.282	1.536	1	7
Men and women suited to	3.351	1.864	1	7
different work				
Dichotomous dependent variables				
Voting for Trump	.398	.490	0	1
Women not equally good leaders	.243	.429	0	1
Not important to fight for equality	.371	.483	0	1
Men and women suited to	.603	.489	0	1
different work				
Independent variables				
Republican	.294	.456	0	1
White	.792	.406	0	1
Male	.476	.500	0	1
No college degree	.483	.500	0	1
Aged 45 or older	.550	.498	0	1
Aged 30 to 44	.223	.416	0	1
Religiosity	.502	.396	0	1
Blue collar	.441	.351	0	1
Rural	.399	.382	0	1
Authoritarianism	.500	.148	0	1
Racial animus	.398	.242	0	1

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

additional respondents from those groups most typically underrepresented in MTurk samples. As a result, our study's respondent pool closely mirrors the composition of larger, nationally representative surveys of likely voters that were also administered in October 2016 with respect to its proportions of males, non-minorities, married individuals, Republicans, conservatives, and religious Americans (Greenberg 2016a).

Even with the oversampling of likely Trump voters, however, the sample still significantly overrepresented millennials and underrepresented individuals aged 45 and older. Our analyses thus all apply a post-stratification age weight to ensure that our data matches the distribution of millennial, middle age, and older voters in the national exit poll for 2016 (Schramm and Castillo 2016).

Support for Gender Equality

We are interested in examining whether the factors that predicted an individual's intention to vote for Trump in 2016 are linked to broader attitudes about the role of women in society. In addition to asking respondents who they anticipated voting for, the instrument included items asking how respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with three statements designed to tap support for gender equality: "Women make just as good *leaders* as men do;" "It is important to continue fighting for *women's equality* in the U.S.;" and "Women and men are best suited towards *different kinds of work*." For each item, the response categories ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree, creating a 7-point Likert scale.³

We examine each of the dependent variables in two ways. First, for a series of linear regression models, we coded each item's response index as an interval variable ranging from 1 to 7. Higher values indicate more resistance to seeing men and women as equals. Thus, we reverse coded the questions about women being equally good leaders and fighting for gender equality. Our remaining analyses estimate dichotomous outcomes. Specifically, respondents were coded (1=yes; 0=no) as being resistant to gender equality if they disagreed or strongly disagreed that women lead as well as men, disagreed or strongly disagreed that it is important to fight for gender equality, or agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that women and men are best suited towards different kinds of work.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

³ Specifically, the response options were: "Strongly disagree," "Disagree," "Somewhat disagree," "Neither agree, nor disagree," "Somewhat agree," "Agree," and "Strongly agree." The survey did not give respondents an option of "don't know," and participants' compensation depended on answering all items.

As shown in the dichotomous measures displayed in Table 1, 24 percent of respondents rejected the idea that women make just as good as leaders as men; 37 percent disagreed that it is important to continue to fight for gender equality; and 60 percent thought that men and women are best suited for different types of jobs. As anticipated, Trump supporters were much less inclined than the other likely voters to support gender equality on each measure. Among the respondents who said they would be voting for Trump, 40 percent rejected the idea that women lead as well as men. This proportion is 26 percentage points higher than the figure for voters supporting one of the other candidates. Just shy of two-thirds of Trump's likely voters did not think it was important to continue fighting for gender equality, a gap of 44 percentage points when compared to other voters. Finally, 76 percent of Trump's voters thought that men and women are best suited for different kinds of work, while less than half of other voters agreed with this this position.

Independent Variables

For five of the independent variables, we created dichotomous indicators (1 = yes; 0= no) to distinguish respondents who said they were *Republican*, *male*, *white*, *aged 30-to-44*, and aged 45 and older (individuals aged under 30 are the reference category).

The survey measured *religiosity* ("Religion is important to me."), living in a *rural area* ["I live in a rural (rather than an urban) area."], and self-identification as a *blue-collar* worker ["I have a blue-collar (rather than white-collar) profession."] by presenting respondents with these statements and the seven point Likert scale explained above. For the sake of consistency in the analyses, each of these variables was rescaled to range from zero to one, and our regression models thus compare respondents with lowest values on each item to those with the highest.

Political scientists examining the characteristics of Trump voters in both the primaries and the general election reported that his supporters scored disproportionately high on authoritarian personality measures (MacWilliams 2016). To explore whether there was a relationship between support for gender equality and an individual's *authoritarian* disposition among 2016 likely voters, we created a 0-to-1 index based on respondents' level of agreement with questions in each of six areas that previous research has linked to higher levels of support for authoritarian leadership. Specifically, individuals who exhibit a proclivity for authoritarianism typically value obedience to authority, desire strong and decisive leaders, are intolerant of minority groups, embrace the use of physical force against outgroups, are anti-intellectual, and lament what they see as a damaging decline in social morality (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005).

Collectively, 12 items in the survey explored attitudes in each of these areas. To measure obedience, we looked at the level of agreement with two statements: "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn," and, "It's important to do what authorities tell us to do." Two measures also informed our understanding of strong and decisive leadership: "It's important that a leader not change their mind about important issues," and "One of the most important things for a leader to do is show strength." To measure intolerance, we used questions asking: "When two things are different from each other, it's usually the case that one is better than another," and "There is too much political correctness in this country." A proclivity for the use of physical coercion was gauged by the statements: "Insults to our honor should always be punished," and "America needs to show the world that it's the strongest country on earth." The two measures of anti-intellectualism were: "The businessman and the manufacturer are more important to our country than artists and writers," and "It is important for a leader to be highly intellectual" (reverse coded). Finally, to gauge moral concerns, we considered, "America has become an increasing immoral place," and "It is a good thing to really enjoy having sex" (reverse coded).

With twelve seven-point items, the measure varied from a potential low of 12 to a high of 84. In practice, however, the lowest score in the respondent pool was 17, while the highest was 81. The former figures were used to rescale the measure of authoritarianism to range from zero to one. The scale reliability for the index is strong: Alpha = .75. Absent of any other controls, and prior to rescaling, the typical Trump voter had an index score that was 11 points higher than non-Trump voters. After rescaling, the average values were .59 for Trump voters and .44 for all others.

Finally, we created a 0-1 measure of *racial animus*, reflecting analysts' findings that Trump's unique capacity to mobilize low-information and reluctant voters, especially working class whites in rural areas, was due to his use of racist and nationalist cues, which appear to have been a powerful motivator for some white voters who believe that minorities' political, social, and demographic gains are coming at their expense (Major, Blodorn and Blascovich 2016; McElwee 2016). Like the measure of authoritarianism, we generated an additive index from multiple survey items using seven-point Likert scale response options. Specifically, we looked at the level of agreement with these four statements: "There are important differences between different races;" "Racial profiling is worthwhile because it makes

Table 2: Trump Voters and Support for Gender Equality						
	Women not equally	Not important to fight	Men and women			
	good leaders (1-7)	for equality (1-7)	suited to different			
			work (1-7)			
Republican	.291(.13)*	.912(.14)***	119(.16)			
White	.047(.11)	.119(.10)	404(.14)**			
Male	.362(.10)***	.444(.10)***	.663(.12)***			
No college degree	.056(.11)	097(.11)	.016(.12)			
Aged 45 or older	210(.11)	246(.11)*	382(.14)**			
Aged 30 to 44	144(.10)	078(.10)	138(.12)			
Religiosity	080(.16)	082(.15)	.296(.16)			
Blue collar	010(.17)	.190(.17)	.386(.19)*			
Rural	128(.15)	.013(.14)	009(.17)			
Authoritarianism	.109(.52)	552(.44)	2.040(.57)***			
Racial animus	2.289(.37)***	2.690(.29)***	3.121(.36)***			
Constant	.884(.20)***	1.046(.17)***	1.022(.24)***			
Observations	942	942	942			
R^2	.23	.36	.36			

Table 2: Trump Voters and Support for Gender Equality

Notes: n=942. OLS Regression with unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

us safer;" "People of color in the U.S. are not treated as well, on average, as white people" (reverse coded); and, "Immigrants threaten American customs and values."

The scale reliability for this index is as strong as our measure for authoritarianism: Alpha = .75. Before being rescaled to range from zero to one, individuals' scores in the sample varied from the lowest to the highest possible values: 4 to 28. The typical Trump voter had a score that was 7 points higher than other voters. In light of the previous research, it is not surprising to see that there is a significant correlation between individuals' levels of authoritarianism and racial animus (r= .70). As such, our multivariate modeling was reviewed for potential multicollinearity problems, but none were found.⁴

Findings

We begin by examining the ordinary least squares regression models shown in Table 2. The columns display the results of models predicting relationship between the independent variables and each of the three dependent variables that capture a person's level of hostility to gender equality, when measured as seven-point Likert scales. The most important finding here is that only some of the factors that led voters to support President Trump's candidacy also correspond with attitudes inimical to gender equality.

In models with the full set of controls, the most powerful predictors are a respondent's level of racial animus and their gender, although authoritarianism matters for some variables. Consistent with our second hypothesis, with a shift over the full range of the racial animus variable, the typical respondent's opposition to gender equality decreased by more than two points when asked about women as leaders and the importance of fighting for equality. Racial animus increased respondents' support of the view that women and men are suited to different work by more than three points (the difference of moving from somewhat disagree to agree). A similarly significant but less powerful effect was found for gender: male respondents were, on average, half a point less likely to support gender equality than their otherwise identical female counterparts.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

⁴ The highest variance inflation factor for any variable was less than three, and the lowest tolerance score was greater than .4, indicating that while most Trump voters did indeed share many qualities, there was still significant variation in the distribution of these characteristics.

The effects of party affiliation and authoritarianism varied, depending how resistance to gender equality was measured. Republicans were much more likely than other identifiers to say it was not important to fight for gender equality, and modestly more likely than others to say that men make better leaders than women. The finding that Republicans so strongly rejected the need to continue to fight for gender equality is striking because it indicates that even after controlling for gender differences, authoritarianism, and various other sources of traditional attitudes, Republicans are still more hostile to key aspects of gender equality than other Americans. With respect to authoritarianism, as respondents moved from the lowest levels to the highest, they were nearly two points more likely to say that men and women were suited to different work, providing support for the third hypothesis. Nevertheless, the effects of authoritarianism were statistically insignificant for each of the two other dependent variables.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

We now turn our attention to the logistic regression models shown in Table 3. The binary dependent variables in these four models allow for a direct comparison between the determinants of voting for Trump and holding attitudes that oppose full gender equality. As in the OLS models, our key predictors here do not perform identically across all four models. Again, we see that most of the demographic controls, outside of gender, have very little influence on any of the dependent variables. Thus, while much of the post-election punditry on 2016's outcome stressed the demographic characteristics of Trump supporters, our findings suggest that likely voters' beliefs about race and their disposition toward authoritarianism were the most important predictors of a person's vote intended vote choice outside of their partisanship.⁵

While there is some overlap between the characteristics that led voters to prefer Trump and those that correlate most strongly with gender bias, there are important differences, too. As in the OLS models, we find here that Republicans are much more likely than other likely voters to reject the idea that it is important to continue to fight for gender equality, providing some additional support for our first hypothesis. Specifically, among Republicans who otherwise were identical to non-Republicans (i.e., when all other variables in the model are held constant at their mean marginal effect), the probability of disagreeing that it is important to continue to fight for women's equality was .54, a full 25 percentage points higher than non-

⁵ Not surprisingly, being Republican was the best predictor of being a Trump supporter (the coefficient for this indicator had a z-score of 10.9). The only two other variables in the model to reach significance at >.01 were racial animus and authoritarianism.

	Voting for	Women not	Not important to	Men and women suited
	Trump in 2016	equally good	fight for equality	to different work (1/0)
		leaders (1/0)	(1/0)	
Republican	12.26(2.83)***	1.56(.30)*	4.02(.76)***	.83(.17)
White	1.81(.48)*	.75(.16)	1.17(.25)	.61(.12)*
Male	1.60(.34)*	1.90(.34)***	2.81(.50)***	2.59(.43)***
No college degree	1.73(.38)*	1.17(.21)	1.07(.19)	1.01(.17)
Aged 45 or older	1.27(.33)	.52(.11)**	.66(.14)	.68(.14)
Aged 30 to 44	1.81(.53)*	.73(.18)	.83(.20)	1.17(.28)
Religiosity	.81(.26)	1.27(.33)	1.16(.30)	1.68(.39)*
Blue collar	.51(.17)*	1.06(.29)	.89(.24)	1.40(.35)
Rural	1.23(.35)	1.03(.24)	1.25(.29)	.91(.20)
Authoritarianism	85.76(97.37)***	1.23(1.12)	.15(.14)*	13.23(10.62)**
Racial animus	221.54(141.26)***	48.65(25.01)**	** 125.02(66.55)*	*** 34.57(16.69)***
Observations	942	942	942	942
Pseudo R2	.62	.26	.28	.35

Table 3: Trump Voters and Support for Gender Equality

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients are odds-ratios; Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Pseudo R2 is approximate and was calculated with data not weighted for age discrepancies between the sample and exit polls.




Figure 1: Min-Max Change in Predicted Probability of Voting for Trump and Expressing Views that Hinder Gender Equality

Note: Bars represent differences in the predicted probability that a person in the relevant group intended to vote for Trump or expressed views contrary to gender equality when compared to the reference groups with all other variables held constant at their mean marginal effect. The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for the estimates.

Republicans. Note, also, that higher levels of racial animus are again the most important predictor in all of the models, and they have a consistent effect. Higher levels of racial animosity not only increased individuals' probability of voting for Trump, but they also powerfully decreased individuals' support for gender equality even in the presence of other predictors, including authoritarianism.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Figure 1 visually summarizes the relationship between our dependent variables and our key predictors. Here, we pay particular attention to the effects of authoritarianism and racial animus, showing how the predicted probability of supporting Trump and holding patriarchal attitudes increases when you go from the lowest to the highest values of each indicator (in this case, 0 to 1).

Individuals who display the highest levels of racial animus are a minority among the American electorate as whole as well as among Trump's supporters. As such, in order to better explore how the mobilization of Trump's unique voting coalition may influence future attitudes and policies toward gender equality, it is useful to consider the effects of levels of racial animus and authorities typical among likely Trump voters.

The average racial animus score for Trump voters was .59, while the average racial animus score for non-Trump voters was .28. Individuals who voted for Trump and therefore display higher levels of racial animus had a predicted probability of .33 of believing men were better leaders than women (versus pr.=.14 for non-Trump voters, a difference of 19 percentage points). Even larger differences were present in questions examining an individual's probability of rejecting the importance of fighting for women (.53 for Trump voters versus .24 for non-Trump voters, a 29 percentage point difference), and in the probability of believing that men and women are suited to different jobs (pr.=.75 for Trump voters and .53 for non-Trump voters, a 22 percentage point difference).

Now, consider the case of authoritarianism. The average authoritarianism score for Trump voters was .59, while the average authoritarianism score for non-Trump voters was .44. The authoritarianism gap has no influence on whether men and women are better leaders (pr.=.24 in both cases), but it does result in different probabilities of rejecting the importance of fighting for women (.35 for Trump voters versus .40 for non-Trump voters). Significant differences emerge in the probability of believing that men and women are suited to different work (pr.=.65 for Trump voters and .58 for non-Trump voters). Thus, we find mixed evidence for our third hypothesis.

Discussion and Conclusion

The main finding of our analysis is that some, but not all, of the same factors that best predicted voting for President Trump are closely related to attitudes rejecting full gender equality in the United States. After controlling for partisanship, racial animus and authoritarian personality, we conclude that most of the demographic factors emphasized by post-election commentary on the election had little influence on who intended to vote for Trump or negative attitudes about the value of gender equality. By comparison, partisanship strongly affected intended vote choice, and it correlates to some types of gender bias, even if this influence is inconsistent. Most importantly, partisanship is strongly connected to the most policyoriented of our measures of gender bias, fighting for women's rights. Even after controlling for other sources of traditional views about gender roles, Republicans were twice as likely as other respondents to disagree that it is important to continue to fight for gender equality. This finding suggests that the Republican Party's longstanding gap in recruiting female candidates at the same rate as Democrats as well as the persistent Republican opposition to policies supported by most national women's rights organizations may reflect core aspects of the party's identity rather than being the results of its disproportionately high share of religious, rural, or male voters.

With respect to the influences of authoritarianism and racial animus on voters, the latter was a powerful predictor of both voting for Trump and hostility to women's equality no matter how gender bias was measured. Leaders among the alt-right celebrated Trump's victory in the hopes that his presidency will further nationalist policies and hinder any additional gains for racial equality (Goldstein 2016; Beauchamp 2016). Our findings demonstrate unequivocally that 2016's motivated, likely voters with high racial animus also hold views that pose a serious threat to gender equality.

In conclusion, we return to our initial question regarding whether Trump's election has reconfigured the American electorate in ways that will stand in the way of efforts to further gender equality. While the results of this analysis cannot speak to the future activism and engagement of Trump voters, we have provided evidence that some of the same attitudes that bolstered Trump's Electoral College victory in 2016 are also related to viewpoints that espouse more traditional roles for women in American society. In recent years. patriarchal viewpoints have played a central role in Republican Party policymaking, including, but not limited to, opposition to equal pay legislation, withdrawing support from a Department of Defense initiative allowing women to serve in combat roles, proposing to defund

Planned Parenthood, efforts to reduce access to contraceptives, and increasing abortion restrictions. As such, the enthusiastic support that voters gave Trump on election day is perhaps not as surprising as analysts first thought. To the extent that his victory represents the successful mobilization of many individuals who hold patriarchal values and who are resistant to continuing to struggle for racial or gender equality, the consequences of his election may reach further than just his presidency. For a long time, the factions of the Republican Party that might most undermine the advancement of women's rights have lacked the public support and institutional control necessary to do so. With the 2016 election, however, the party now has ample institutional power, controlling both houses of Congress, the executive branch, and presumably the Supreme Court. If the Trump team can maintain the engagement, activism, and support of his vocal and newly activated group of supporters, many of whom passionately hold explicitly or implicitly racist, sexist, and authoritarian attitudes, it may mean that the barriers to harming women's rights are lower than they have been in decades.

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